By Leslie Maribel Bravo ’28

On March 2, 2026, the United States Supreme Court released a per curiam decision on Mirabelli v. Bonta, a case from its emergency docket. The court ruled in favor of California parents, requiring school officials and teachers to notify parents if their child had changed the name they use in school or their pronouns. 

The Court was split on whether to fully grant this application to vacate, resulting in a partially granted application towards the parents only. Justice Amy Coney Barrett delivered a concurring opinion, which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, with Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joining. 

Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito voted to grant the application in full, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor voted to deny the application in full. The grant in part to vacate the stay is a denial of the request of the teachers, but a grant of the request of the parents. 

Mirabelli v. Bonta originally started as a lawsuit by two California teachers, who were later joined by parents of children who had not been informed of their children’s name or pronoun changes. Both the parents and teachers cited the First and Fourth Amendments–the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The parents claimed religious exemptions from California’s policies as well as the right to direct their child’s upbringing and education. The case was originally decided in favor of the parents before the State of California decided to appeal the case.

The Court believes that the case will be resolved in favor of the parents and their rights as protected by the First and Fourth Amendment, therefore justifying their decision to grant the application in part to the parents. The Court states that not only are these policies in violation of freedom of religion, but that the due process clause applies because “[u]nder long-established precedent, parents–not the State–have primary authority with respect to ‘the upbringing and education of children.’” The Court in this respect cites Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). 

The Court in the per curiam decision lists three reasons for which it has granted the application of the parents. Firstly, the parents are likely to succeed on the merits. Secondly, “the denial of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights during the potentially protected appellate process constitutes irreparable harm.” Finally, they concluded that the safety of children “is the overriding equity,” especially considering one of the children in this case attempted suicide. Therefore, the 9th Circuit Court cannot just deprive parents of this judgment—which was in their favor—as it can put the lives of children at risk by preventing parents from making important decisions about their children’s lives. 

Justice Barrett cites Court precedent established in Washington v. Glucksberg (1997). The Court’s “demanding test for recognizing unexpressed rights” dictates that rights must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” as well as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Justice Barrett concludes that California’s policies are unlikely to pass this test, and that is why the Court has ruled in favor of the parents. 

Justice Kagan’s dissent criticizes the Court for violating its own rules and procedures by deciding to grant the application to vacate in part, and disagrees with the reasoning of the per curiam order and concurring opinion. She states, “The Due Process Clause… does not expressly grant parental rights of any kind.” She calls the Court “impatient” and states that, “The Court jumps the line, pre-empting the Ninth Circuit’s normal (and notably reflective) en banc process. Why wait for appellate procedures to play out when the Court already knows what it wants?”

In this statement, she makes an intriguing case. The Court likes to be seen as the last resort, and, as a result, it implements rules and procedures to limit its docket each year, often denying certiorari because the parties have not exhausted every available option before taking their case to the Supreme Court. Therefore, this decision shows that the Court is using its emergency docket to further its policies and violate its existing precedents and rules. 

Justice Kagan highlights that the Supreme Court is interrupting the normal appeals process because it is impatient and already knows what it would rule should the case reach the Court. This criticism highlights a very important point: If the Supreme Court does not follow its own procedures and rules, what shall the rest of the judicial system do? Furthermore, will the Supreme Court continue to go against its own precedents and rules that it established for itself?

Justice Kagan’s ending statement to her dissenting opinion encompasses the significance of this per curiam decision beyond the Court ruling in favor of the parents: “Our processes are, in short, the hallmark of judicial probity, and alike is guarantor. There was no reason to abandon them here. I respectfully dissent.”

Contributor: Emily Villa ’27

Photo Credit: Elvert Barnes/Wikimedia Commons